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Pros and Cons of Digital Solutions for the Implementation 
of Freedom of Movement and Residence in the Schengen Area 
in the Era of the COVID-19 Pandemic
Abstract: Th e COVID-19 pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV–2 coronavirus, which emerged in Europe 
in January 2020, gave rise to restrictions by European Union Member States on freedom of movement 
and residence in the Schengen area. Individual actions by states mobilized the EU to take formal 
steps as well as to implement practical solutions to coordinate the eff orts of all Member States. Digital 
solutions belong to the practical measures. Th eir implementation may bring potential benefi ts but is also 
associated with the possibility of potential risks. Th is article presents the basic assumptions of freedom 
of movement and residence in the Schengen area and their limitations by Member States justifi ed by 
public health reasons. Th e characteristics of digital solutions for facilitating freedom of movement 
during the COVID-19 pandemic are then presented, taking into account their eff ectiveness. Th e paper 
concludes with a presentation of the benefi ts and potential risks associated with the implementation of 
selected digital solutions by the European Union. 
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Introduction
Freedom of movement and residence within the Schengen area is considered 
to be one of the greatest achievements of European integration and the right most 
appreciated by EU citizens.1 Millions of Europeans and third-country nationals use 
1 P. Buras, Europe’s Fragile Freedoms Facing a Coronavirus Stress Test, “Stift ung Genshagen Paper 
Series: Acting European? Th e European Union and the Weimar Triangle in the Coronavirus 
154
Wioleta Hryniewicka-Filipkowska
Bialystok Legal Studies 2021 vol. 26 nr 3
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze
it every year to travel for tourism, business or other purposes. Th ese journeys are not 
subject to identity checks or conditions of entry and stay. However, there are situations 
when the long-forgotten physical borders between countries and the associated 
border controls must return for a while, thereby limiting the possibility of exercising 
this freedom, which is in accordance with European Union law. COVID-19 and its 
aft ermath has verifi ed the EU’s capabilities and concepts in this regard. 
Th e aim of this article is to discuss the restrictions on freedom of movement 
and residence in the Schengen area in relation to the protection of public health and 
to identify modern digital solutions to improve the implementation of freedom of 
movement in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic. Th e article adopts the following 
research hypothesis: not all tools introduced by the EU are eff ective and bring tangible 
benefi ts. Digital solutions carry potential risks.
Th e article was written using dogmatic and descriptive methods. Th e fi rst was 
used to identify and interpret the provisions of EU law regulating restrictions on 
freedom of movement and residence in the Schengen area justifi ed on public health 
grounds. Th e descriptive method was used to depict the digital solutions designed to 
implement freedom of movement and residence in the Schengen area in the era of 
the COVID-19 pandemic.
1. Restrictions on Freedom of Movement and Residence 
in the Schengen Area Justifi ed on Public Health Grounds
Freedom of movement and residence within the territories of the Member 
States does not operate unconditionally. Under the law of the European Union, it 
is subject to certain limitations. In the preamble to the Treaty on European Union 
(hereinaft er TEU), the Member States, while expressing their intention to facilitate 
the free movement of persons, stipulated that this freedom is to be exercised with due 
regard for the security of the nationals of the Member States by establishing an area 
of freedom, security and justice in accordance with the provisions of the treaties.2 
Subsequently, in the substantive provisions of the TEU, in Article 3(2), the EU 
legislator indicates that the free movement of persons operates in conjunction with 
the application of certain instruments for the control of the EU’s external borders, 
asylum, immigration, and the prevention and combating of crime.3 On the other hand, 
in Article 21(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinaft er 
Crisis” 2020, no. 6, p. 2, http://www.stift ung-genshagen.de/uploads/media/Acting_ European_
No_6.pdf (accessed 20.04.2021).
2 Preamble of the TEU (Journal of Laws UE C 326 of 26.10.2012). 
3 See T.  Dubowski, Granica polsko-rosyjska jako zewnętrzna granica Unii Europejskiej, 
‘Białostockie Studia Prawnicze’ 2011, no. 9, p. 78 and Art. 3(2) TEU (Journal of Laws UE C 326 of 
26.10.2012).
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TFEU), the EU legislator stresses that freedom of movement and residence within the 
territories of the Member States is to take into account the limitations and conditions 
laid down in the treaties and in the measures adopted to give them eff ect.4 As Paweł 
Szewczyk rightly observes, the treaties do not explicitly specify which provisions 
should be taken into account in this case.5 Th e right approach seems to be to adopt 
the limitations indicated for the broadly defi ned freedom of movement of persons, 
of which freedom of movement and residence within the territories of the Member 
States is a component. Th ose restrictions include grounds of public policy, public 
security and public health.6 Moreover, conditions concerning restrictions on the 
exercising of the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States may be laid down by secondary legislation. Th e restrictions on freedom of 
movement and residence caused by a threat to public health are supplemented by 
Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States; however, in terms of the occurrence 
of threats to public health, the regulations are quite sparing. Pursuant to it, Member 
States have the right to restrict freedom of movement and residence on the grounds 
of a threat to public health.7 Th is is justifi ed by the threat of epidemic diseases 
listed by the World Health Organization and the threat of other infectious diseases 
or contagious parasitic diseases if they are the subject of protection provisions for 
nationals of the host Member State. In addition, under the Directive, Member States 
may require a person with the right of movement and residence to undergo, free of 
charge, a medical examination within three months of arrival in order to certify that 
he or she does not suff er from any epidemic or contagious disease. However, the 
Directive stipulates that such examinations must not be carried out routinely. Th e 
requirement to carry out such examinations is to be based on legitimate grounds.8 
When introducing restrictions due to the above premises, the state cannot justify 
them with economic objectives, e.g. to protect the domestic labour market. It seems 
that according to the principle of necessary requirements9 indicated by the Court of 
4 Art. 21(1) TFEU (Journal of Laws UE C 326 of 26.10.2012).
5 P.  Szewczyk, Ograniczenia swobody przemieszczania się i pobytu obywateli UE uzasadnione 
względami porządku oraz bezpieczeństwa publicznego, ‘Studia Prawnicze. Rozprawy i Materiały’ 
2016, vol. 19, no. 2, p. 187. 
6 Art. 45(3) and Art. 52(1) TFEU (Journal of Laws UE C 326 of 26.10.2012).
7 Art. 27(1), Directive 2004/38 / EC.
8 Ibidem, Art. 29.
9 Th is principle applies directly to restrictions on the free movement of goods justifi ed on valid 
grounds other than those set out in the Treaty. According to doctrinal considerations, it may 
apply in other cases, e.g. with regard to freedom of movement and residence. See M. Wiącek, 
Ograniczenia swobody przepływu osób w Unii Europejskiej – przypadek Romów we Francji 
w 2010 r., (in:) A.  Frąckowiak-Adamska and A.  Śledzińska-Simon (eds.), Sytuacja prawna 
i społeczna Romów w Europie, Wrocław 2011, pp. 56–57.
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Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the Cassis de Dijon case,10 a Member State, 
when imposing restrictions on the exercising of freedom of movement and residence, 
including on the grounds of a threat to public health, must take measures which are 
proportionate, non-discriminatory and necessary to protect the public interest, but 
which take account of the EU’s interest in exercising that freedom. Th e burden of 
proof for compliance with those requirements lies with the Member State.11
Until March 2020, the EU was only known to restrict freedom of movement and 
residence due to a need to ensure public order and security within the territory of 
Member States. For example, in recent years, Austria, Germany, France, Denmark, 
Sweden and Norway have maintained controls at the internal borders of the Schengen 
area in connection with the ongoing migration crisis in 2015–2016. Although the 
situation has improved signifi cantly, these countries continue to maintain control at 
certain sections of the border, citing security concerns and terrorist threats.12 We also 
witnessed the temporary closure of borders by France in 2015 due to a series of 
terrorist attacks, and the introduction of temporary controls at the internal borders 
of EU Member States in connection with the organization of political summits such 
as the G8, G20 or NATO and the organization of sports events such as Euro 2008 and 
Euro 2012.13 
Th e COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented case of such a large-scale 
restriction on freedom of movement and residence in the Schengen area due to the 
premise of a public health threat in EU Member States. Th e fi rst infection in Europe 
was reported on 24 January 2020 in France. Two months later, the European Union 
became the global epicentre of the disease, with a huge wave of cases fi rst in Italy 
and then in Spain, France, the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries. By April 
2020, the virus was present throughout Europe. Th e Member States of the Schengen 
zone, due to their right to restrict freedom in a public health emergency, individually 
began to implement restrictions. Various forms of controls were introduced at the 
internal borders of the Schengen zone. Th e restrictions consisted of reopening fewer 
border crossings; sanitary controls at border crossings, where travellers had to take 
their body temperature and fi ll in a card with their contact details and whereabouts 
10 Judgment of the Court of 20 February 1979 in the case of Rewe-Zentral AG v. 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein. Reference for preliminary ruling: Hessisches 
Finanzgericht, C 120/78, p. 662.
11 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines concerning the exercise of the free movement 
of workers during COVID-19 outbreak 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3 A52020XC0330%2803%29 (accessed 20.04.2021). 
12 J.  Szymańska, Strefa Schengen w dobie pandemii Covid 19, ‘Biuletyn Polski Instytut Spraw 
międzynarodowych’ 2020, no. 62 (1994), pp.1–2. 
13 See P.  Rosik, T.  Komornicki, S.  Goliszek and P.  Duma, Dostępność potencjałowa regionów 
w Europie – zasięg przestrzenny, długość podróży efekt granicy (EU-ROAD-ACC), Warsaw 2020, 
p. 31. 
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in order to be informed quickly if they came into contact with an infected person; 
travellers having to show a negative coronavirus test certifi cate; being banned from 
entering a Member State; and fi nally, closing all borders and having to undergo 
quarantine for several days aft er entering a Member State.14 
In view of the situation, the measures taken by the states appeared to be justifi ed, 
but the problem was that each of them basically acted individually, with diff erent 
preventive measures. Th e manner in which they were introduced highlighted 
serious problems in the management of the Schengen area that had not previously 
been apparent. Th e restrictions that were introduced helped in the fi ght against the 
pandemic, but were imposed in an uncoordinated manner that aff ected even essential 
travel and the free movement of goods.15 
It can be said that there was no uniform approach to the introduction of 
restrictions, which led to chaos, mutual tensions and, importantly, to the suspension 
by Member States of freedom of movement within the Schengen area. Th e problem 
was not just the various restrictions that were introduced, but the rapid pace of 
their implementation and modifi cation. People travelling within the Schengen area 
lost track of the constantly changing rules and principles for crossing borders and 
staying in the Member States. Cross-border workers who live and work in two EU 
Member States were in an extremely diffi  cult situation. People from the Polish-Czech 
or Polish-German border region had to face this kind of problem. Th e introduction 
of border controls made it very diffi  cult for cross-border workers to move from their 
place of residence to their place of work and, if the borders were closed, forced them 
to choose between losing their earning opportunities and being separated from their 
families. Another problem was the obligation to undergo quarantine for several days 
aft er crossing the border or the obligation to perform regular coronavirus tests, which 
in turn entailed expense, limited availability and long waiting times for results.16 Th e 
European Commission reacted to the above problem by issuing guidelines on the 
free movement of workers during the COVID-19 epidemic as early as 30 March 
2020, paying particular attention to cross-border workers.17 Th e proportionality of 
protection measures taken by Member States can also be questioned. For example, 
Hungary and Poland closed their borders to third-country nationals in March 2020 
during the fi rst wave of the pandemic in Europe.18 
14 Ibidem, p. 32 and J. Szymańska, Strefa Schengen, op. cit., pp. 1–2.
15 D.  Schade, Crisis-Proof Schengen and Freedom of Movement: Lessons from the Covid-19 
Pandemic, Hertie School, Jacques Delors Centre, Berlin 2021, p. 2.
16 See Polish cross-border workers stage protests against restrictions, 25 April 2020, https://www.
thefi rstnews.com/article/polish-cross-border-workers-stage-protests-against-restrictions-12252 
(accessed 20.04.2021).
17 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines concerning, op. cit.
18 See S. Robin-Olivier, Free Movement of Workers in the Light of the COVID-19 Sanitary Crisis: 
From Restrictive Selection to Selective Mobility, ‘European Papers’ 2020, vol. 5, no. 1, p. 615.
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Th e problem of the application of various measures by Member States to limit 
the spread of the pandemic was recognized by the European Union from the very 
beginning. Th e need to coordinate them was taken for granted, but in many cases 
this proved impossible, despite the best eff orts of the European Commission and 
the support of other entities.19 Th e organization has adopted a number of formal 
measures to coordinate its activities. At the EU level, a number of conclusions, 
recommendations, guidelines and communications have been developed to support 
the coordination eff orts of the Member States and to guarantee freedom of movement 
within the Schengen area.20 Th e EU has also decided to implement several digital 
solutions to help gradually restore freedom of movement and residence for EU 
Member States. 
2. Selected Digital Solutions for the Implementation of Freedom 
of Movement of People in the Schengen Area During the COVID-19 
Pandemic
Th e rapid spread of the virus required the EU institutions to take practical steps 
to slow down its transmission and protect the health and lives of EU citizens while 
allowing, as much as possible, the movement of people, goods and services in full 
compliance with health requirements. As a fi rst step, the Re-open portal was launched 
on 15 June 2020, accessible on PC and mobile devices (since 14 December 2020, the 
portal is also available as a mobile application). Th e tool helps travellers and tourists 
19 D. Schade, Crisis-Proof Schengen, op. cit., p. 2. 
20 See Commission Guidelines for border management measures to protect health and ensure the 
availability of goods and essential services (OJ C 86I, 16.03.2020, p. 1); Commission Guidelines 
concerning the exercise of the free movement of workers during COVID-19 outbreak (OJ C 102I, 
30.03.2020, p.12); ‘Joint European Roadmap towards lift ing COVID-19 containment measures’ 
of the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Council, 
Commission Guidance on free movement of health professionals and minimum harmonisation of 
training in relation to COVID-19 emergency measures (OJ C 156, 08.05.2020, p. 1); Commission 
Communication towards a phased and coordinated approach for restoring freedom of movement 
and lift ing internal border controls (OJ C 169, 15.05.2020, p. 30); Commission Communication 
on the third assessment of the application of the temporary restriction on non-essential travel to 
the EU (COM(2020) 299 fi nal); Commission Guidelines on seasonal workers in the EU in the 
context of the COVID-19 outbreak (OJ C 235I, 17.07.2020, p. 1); Commission Communication on 
the implementation of the Green Lanes under the Guidelines for border management measures to 
protect health and ensure the availability of goods and essential services (OJ C 96I, 24.03.2020, p. 
1); Commission Guidelines on Facilitating Air Cargo Operations during COVID-19 outbreak (OJ 
C 100I, 27.03.2020, p. 1); Commission Guidelines on protection of health, repatriation and travel 
arrangements for seafarers, passengers and other persons on board ships (OJ C 119, 14.04.2020, 
p.1); and Council Recommendation (EU) 2020/1475 of 13 October 2020 on a coordinated 
approach to the restriction of free movement in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (OJ L 337, 
14.10.2020, pp. 3–9).
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to travel safely within the Union in accordance with the applicable health regulations. 
Th e portal provides the basic and most up-to-date information on safety, travel, 
crossing internal borders, quarantine and testing for coronavirus in each Member 
State, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. Th e information on the portal 
is pre-screened by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and the 
Member States, and published in the 24 offi  cial languages of the EU.21 
Other digital solutions being implemented to support coronavirus containment 
and thereby enable people’s freedom of movement for work and tourism, in parallel 
with the Re-open portal, are national contact-tracing and alerting apps. Th e 
mechanism of an app is its installation on a smartphone device. Once it is launched, 
the app uses Bluetooth-based physical proximity data to detect other devices 
equipped with the same app in the vicinity. A person on the app who tests positive for 
COVID-19 alerts other app users that they have been within 2 metres of an infected 
person for a minimum of 15 minutes. At that point, those at risk of becoming infected 
can take necessary steps such as self-isolation and coronavirus testing to break 
the chain of infection. To integrate national contact-tracing and alerting apps, the 
European Commission has created an EU-wide system to ensure interoperability - 
the so-called ‘network gateway’. Th e implementation of this solution allows the users 
to move around the European Union with a single app. 
On 17 March 2021 the European Commission proposed the implementation 
of a new digital solution in the EU area, the Digital Green Certifi cate (also known 
as the COVID Certifi cate or Green Certifi cate), which in the era of the ongoing 
pandemic is expected to facilitate movement and stays in the Member States. Th e 
project will be fully implemented on 1 July 2021, and France is expected to be the fi rst 
country to test the Digital COVID-19 Travel Certifi cate through the application.22 
Th e certifi cate is to be issued free of charge on paper or digitally, in English or in 
the offi  cial language of the issuing Member State. Th e document will be issued at 
the request of the person concerned by national treatment providers, e.g. primary 
care providers or vaccination centres. Each citizen will also be able to download 
the certifi cate personally from a selected national application (including a mobile 
device) dedicated to civic aff airs or health issues (e.g. in Poland, the Internet Patient 
Account (IKP) and the mObywatel app). An individual will be able to obtain one of 
three types of certifi cate. Each of them will contain the date of issue; data confi rming 
the identity of the person, including their name, surname and date of birth; a QR 
code; information on the certifi cate issuer; and a unique certifi cate identifi er. Th e 
21 Offi  cial website of the European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/
coronavirus-response/travel-during-coronavirus-pandemic_pl (accessed 25.04.2021).
22 France Becomes First EU Country to Start Testing Digital COVID-19 Travel Certifi cate Th rough 
App, 21 April 2021, https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/france-becomes-fi rst-eu-country-
to-start-testing-digital-covid-19-travel-certifi cate-through-app/ (accessed 02.06.2021).
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fi rst of these types of certifi cate is the vaccine receipt certifi cate, which, in addition 
to the above data, indicates the name of the disease to which the vaccination applies; 
the name of the vaccine received; the name of its manufacturer and the serial 
numbers of the dose(s); the date the vaccination was received; and the name of the 
country in which the vaccination was administered. Th is certifi cate is valid for one 
year. Th e certifi cate will not be available until 14 days aft er receiving a single dose 
or the second dose of a vaccine. Th e second type is the SARS-CoV–2 coronavirus 
negative test certifi cate, which includes information about the test performed (the 
type of test, name of test, name of test manufacturer), the date and time the sample 
was collected for testing, information about the place that performed the test, the 
test result and an indication of the country where the test was performed. Th is type 
of certifi cate is valid for 48 hours. At this stage, PCR tests are recognized. Th e last 
type of certifi cate is the COVID-19 recovery certifi cate, which indicates the date of 
a fi rst positive test result and the name of the country where the test was performed. 
Recovery status is obtained 11 days aft er the test and is valid for 180 days. Th ese types 
of certifi cates are not travel documents and do not replace the current requirement 
for travel documents in the form of an ID card or passport. Th eir possession exempts 
individuals from quarantine or the obligation to undergo additional tests. On the 
other hand, the absence of such a document when crossing a border will result in an 
obligation to fully comply with the prevailing pandemic restrictions. Th e certifi cates 
will be recognized by all Member States, as well as Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein, 
and will be readable through a specially designed EU COVID Certifi cate System 
to which countries will subscribe. Th e certifi cate will be presented to the border 
authorities when travelling. By scanning the QR code on the certifi cate using the EU 
COVID Certifi cate app, the offi  cer will read the identity of the certifi cate holder and 
check its authenticity and validity.23
Th e digital solutions proposed by the European Union to enable freedom of 
movement and residence in the Schengen area have been accepted by EU Member 
States. Th eir implementation gives hope for a quick return to pre-pandemic times. 
However, apart from the benefi ts that seem to be obvious, they carry potential 
threats. 
23 Offi  cial website of the European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/
coronavirus-response/safe-covid-19-vaccines-europeans/eu-digital-covid-certificate_en; 
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3. Benefi ts of Implementing Selected Digital Solutions 
Europeans fi nd the Re-open portal useful for people who need to move to and 
stay in other Member States.24 Th e successive waves of infections have shown how 
diffi  cult it is to move around Europe when each country imposes its own sanitary 
restrictions. New information is constantly appearing in the media and on social 
networks, which becomes outdated quite quickly. Th e implementation of the tool 
provides the latest data on the epidemiological situation in individual countries and 
the rules of crossing internal EU borders. It seems that, despite the introduction of 
the Digital Green Certifi cate, portal will continue to fulfi ll its role. As statistics show, 
a large number of Europeans have not yet been vaccinated.25 Among this social group, 
some people will choose never to receive the vaccine due to health aspects or their 
own beliefs. When travelling within the Schengen area, they will need to be aware 
of the current epidemiological situation in the countries. Th e portal is administered 
by the EU, which further strengthens the credibility and timeliness of its content. 
However, the content is not exhaustive, but it is important that it contains links to 
more detailed information. A defi nite disadvantage in the assessment of this tool is 
the minimum standard of accessibility for people with disabilities. Th e functioning of 
the portal does not entail serious risks; it can only make travelling diffi  cult if the data 
is not up to date. However, so far, the data is supplemented on an ongoing basis. 
Epidemic monitoring, which aims to limit the spread of the virus, mainly uses 
traditional contact-tracing methods. Th ese involve identifying people who may have 
had contact with an infected person and providing information about the potential 
for infection, the need to undertake self-isolation and the provision of necessary 
care.26 Th e idea of implementing contact-tracing and alerting apps also seemed to 
be a useful solution to complement the traditional methods mentioned. A defi nite 
benefi t of this type of solution, highlighted by the Council of Europe, is the speed 
of transmission of information about the potential possibility of infection;27 in the 
case of the spread of the virus, its new and more infectious variants are of great 
importance. Applications for contact tracing and alerting can be considered a tool to 
support the work of national sanitary services (using traditional methods of contact 
tracing). In Poland, especially during the second wave of infections, these services 
were becoming less and less effi  cient in quickly providing information to people 
24 Chaos na wewnętrznych granicach, Witryna internetowa Filary Biznesu, 4 November 2020, , 
https://fi larybiznesu.pl/chaos-na-wewnetrznych-granicach-ue/a6909 (accessed 25.04.2010).
25 Szczepienia przeciwko koronawirusowi w Polsce, Europie i na świecie – Zestawienie, https://
www.euractiv.pl/section/zdrowie/news/pandemia-szczepienia-koronawirus-polska-europa-
swiat-covid19-porownanie/ (accessed 25.04.2021).





Bialystok Legal Studies 2021 vol. 26 nr 3
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze
who could potentially be infected. Th e application is a faster alternative tool to the 
information from the appropriate services to warn about the potential threat. 
Another benefi t of the solution is its reach. Th e national application works not 
only within the Member State, but thanks to the network gateway created by the 
European Commission, it enables the exchange of information between applications 
of other EU Member States. Th erefore it can be useful when travelling and staying 
in other Member States that have adopted this solution. Th e benefi ts of the app were 
highlighted by Internal Market Commissioner Th ierry Breton and Commissioner 
for Health and Food Safety Stella Kyriakides, among others. Th e latter stated that ‘At 
a time when we are relaunching social and economic life, digital technologies are 
very useful to alert our citizens to the risk of infection, and to break the chains of 
infection.’28 She also pointed out a crucial aspect of the success of the adopted solution, 
namely the number of users. In order for the app to fulfi ll its function, it must be 
used by approximately 60% of the population.29 Despite positive opinions about the 
importance and benefi ts of this solution, it did not gain complete acceptance among 
EU Member States. Th e apps have been implemented in 22 countries, including 
17 countries opting for decentralized architecture30 (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain) and fi ve states in a centralized 
architecture31 (Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Slovakia, Hungary). However, fi ve countries 
have decided not to implement this type of solution (Greece, Luxembourg, Lithuania, 
Romania, Sweden).32
 Apps have not gained recognition among Europeans, as illustrated by publicly 
available data. In Germany, for example, the Corona-Warn-App (as of May 2021) 
had been downloaded by over 33% of citizens (28 million people),33 which should 
be considered a good result in comparison with Poland, where the STOP COVID 
ProteGo Safe app (as of April 2021) was downloaded by fewer than 5% of citizens 
28 European Commission Press Release, Coronavirus: Member States agree on an interoperability 
solution for mobile tracing and warning apps, Brussels, 16 June 2020, p. 1.
29 K.  Szymielewicz, A.  Obem and T.  Zieliński, Jak Polska walczy z koronawirusem i dlaczego 
aplikacja nas przed nim nie ochroni?, https://panoptykon.org/protego-safe-ryzyka (accessed 
20.05.2021). 
30 Th is provides only for the processing of anonymous identifi ers and the exchange of data, without 
involving the administration.
31 Th is enables the collection of data allowing for the unambiguous identifi cation of individuals and 
the transfer of this data to the relevant administrative authorities (e.g. the sanitary administration, 
but also the police).
32 Council of Europe, Digital solutions, op. cit., pp. 27–28.
33 Anzahl der Downloads der Corona-Warn-App über den Apple App Store und den Google 
Play Store in Deutschland von Juni 2020 bis Mai 2021, https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/
studie/1125951/umfrage/ downloads-der-corona-warn-app/ (accessed 03.06.2021).
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(1.9 million).34 It is diffi  cult to estimate how many people in Europe currently use the 
app. Installing an app is not equivalent to using it and responding to warnings. Th e 
reasons for the low popularity of the use of apps will be discussed in the next part of 
the article devoted to threats resulting from digital solutions. 
In the case of the Digital Green Certifi cate project, the Member States were 
initially very sceptical about the idea, which also caused uncertainty among 
Europeans, but in fact it is already a known solution and, in addition, is compliant 
with the law. For many years a similar tool has been used without which one cannot 
enter several countries in the world: the International Vaccination Booklet (the so-
called yellow booklet). It is used to document vaccination against yellow fever, which, 
according to WHO health regulations, is a mandatory vaccination required for entry 
into parts of African and South American countries. Th e booklet is now an offi  cial 
document recognized around the world, and is obtained at the point where the 
vaccination is performed. Recommended vaccinations can also be recorded in this 
document.35 
Th e benefi ts of implementing the Digital Green Certifi cate are obvious. Th e 
certifi cates will make the rules for crossing internal borders of the Schengen area 
uniform in all Member States, which is defi nitely a great convenience for travellers 
in Europe. Although border controls will not disappear, it can be predicted that the 
verifi cation of travellers on the basis of the certifi cate will signifi cantly streamline 
border traffi  c and thus reduce the waiting time to cross the border. What is more, the 
possibility of travelling for tourist purposes will return, which will bring measurable 
economic benefi ts, especially for countries whose main industry is tourism. Moving 
and staying in other Member States and returning to one’s own country will not 
require tests or a quarantine period of several days. Cross-border workers will not 
have problems with getting to work and returning home to their families. 
It can also be predicted that the introduction of the certifi cate will change the 
attitude of those hesitant or sceptical about receiving the vaccine, especially those who 
are keen on travelling. Although it will be possible to travel without the certifi cate, not 
having it will be a kind of complication in achieving travel goals, which will perhaps 
change the decision. 
34 Odpowiedź na interpelację nr 22103 w sprawie aplikacji STOP COVID, https://www.sejm.gov.pl/
sejm9.nsf/ InterpelacjaTresc.xsp?key=C2KJDB, Warsaw, 28.04.2021 (accessed 28.05.2021).
35 P.  Orlikowski, Paszport covidowy budzi kontrowersje, a ‘żółta książeczka’ istnieje od lat. 
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4. Potential Risks of Selected Digital Solutions 
Digital solutions adopted within the EU carry the risk of potential threats. Th e 
implementation of the Digital Green Certifi cate and applications to trace and alert 
from infectious contacts has not been free from individuals’ concerns about violations 
of privacy rights.36 As rightly noticed by Zygmunt Niewiadomski and Marek Zirk-
Sadowski, the eff ects of digitization may be particularly severe for citizens, and one 
of the most serious threats is the far-reaching restriction of privacy. Th e authors 
emphasize that the greater the degree of public threat, the more oft en the public 
authority uses measures restricting the private sphere of the citizen. Th is is because 
digitization off ers greater opportunities for action, also for those who pose a security 
risk, so there is never-ending action in this area.37
In the case of apps, it is worth quoting the statement of the Commissioner for 
Health and Food Safety, Kyriakides, who said that their operation would respect data 
security, fundamental rights and the protection of individual privacy. To this end, 
the European Commission has developed a set of rules that must be strictly applied 
before the apps are made available. According to these principles, the installation 
and use of apps should be voluntary. Th e scope of the data collected is minimal, 
necessary for the provision of the service and does not allow the identifi cation of 
specifi c individuals. Th e data is protected by state-of-the-art technologies, including 
encryption. Moreover, the European Commission does not allow the use of such data 
to determine the location or track the movement of people. Th e apps should be created 
using Bluetooth technology and the data obtained through them cannot be stored for 
more than 14 days. Th e Commissioner further assures that the apps will be turned 
off  once the pandemic is over. She also confi rms that health data is sensitive and its 
processing must follow strict rules. She points out that the aggregated statistical data 
collected does not allow the identifi cation of individuals but only serves the purpose 
of contact tracing, and therefore the General Data Protection Regulation does not 
apply to it.38 Th e above position was confi rmed by the Polish Ministry of Digitization, 
36 See Aplikacja ‘Kwarantanna domowa’ budzi wątpliwości obywateli. Rzecznik pisze do premiera, 
13 November 2020, https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-do-premiera-aplikacja-kwarantanna-
domowa-budzi-watpliwosci (accessed 29.04.2021).
37 Z. Niewiadomski and M. Zirk-Sadowski, Prawo wobec wyzwań epoki cyfryzacji, (in:) J. Gajewski, 
W. Paprocki and J. Pieriegud (eds.), Cyfryzacja gospodarki i społeczeństwa szanse i wyzwania dla 
sektorów infrastrukturalnych, Gdańsk 2016, pp. 205–209.
38 Offi  cial website of the European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/
coronavirus-response/travel-during-coronavirus-pandemic/how-tracing-and-warning-apps-
can-help-during-pandemi.pl (accessed 26.04.2021) and Art. 9 Regulation (EU) No 2016/679 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 04.05.2016, 
pp. 1–88).
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which assured that the information held on the devices is anonymous, encoded and 
stored in the phone only for a period of two weeks.39 
However, these assurances did not encourage mass adoption of the app. Th e idea 
failed for several reasons. Firstly, the EU Member States did not agree on a single path 
for implementing the app. Th ey did not adopt a unifi ed digital architecture and some 
states decided not to implement the tool, which defi nitely hindered interoperability. 
Moreover, not all countries that declared implementation of the project have 
registered in the common system. Secondly, it seems that the main reason for shying 
away from this solution by the majority of the public is a fear for the security and 
privacy of users and the fear of intervention by the sanitary administration and 
quarantine obligations. Moreover, digital experts point out that the application 
may report numerous false alarms, due to the fact that the Bluetooth signal reaches 
through walls. Th is means that the devices are communicating while their users are 
not actually in contact with each other. Th erefore false messages may appear, which 
will needlessly limit the freedom of individuals. It should also be emphasized that 
the implementation of this type of solution may suppress the vigilance of citizens 
and lead to disregard for the main recommendations in terms of maintaining social 
distance and hygiene rules or limiting social contacts.40 
As Alessandra Spadaro rightly points out, epidemics are a threat not only to 
human health but also to human rights,41 and in this situation all human rights are 
at stake.42 Fernando Dias Simões points out that there is a deep connection between 
these two aspects, because under human rights law, states have a duty to protect 
public health by struggling to control a pandemic, but they also have a duty to protect 
other fundamental human rights. Measures taken by states such as forced quarantine 
or travel restrictions can violate the rights to bodily integrity, to privacy, to freedom 
from inhuman or degrading treatment, to freedom from discrimination and to 
freedom of movement.43
As has already been emphasized, the Digital Green Certifi cate project raised 
a lot of emotions in its initial stage because of the protection of human rights. Th ere 
were some voices asking if the certifi cates are really safe and whether the solutions 
used will protect the privacy of individuals, or if they pose a threat of far-reaching 
39 ProteGOSafe – pobierz, zainstaluj, przetestuj, 29.04.2020, https://www.gov.pl/web/cyfryzacja/
protego-safe--pobierz-zainstaluj-przetestuj (accessed 26.04.2020).
40 ProteGOSafe: instalować czy nie?, 3 August 2021, https://panoptykon.org/czy-instalowac-
protego-safe (accessed 27.04.2021). 
41 A. Spadaro, Covid 19: Testing the Limits of Human Rights, ‘European Journal of Risk Regulation’ 
2020, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 317–318. 
42 K.  Bennoune, ‘Lest We Should Sleep’: COVID-19 and Human Rights, ‘American Journal of 
International Law’ 2020, vol. 114, no. 4, p. 666.
43 F.D. Simões, COVID-19 and International Freedom of Movement: A Stranded Human Right? 
Hong Kong 2021, p. 5. 
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surveillance by the authorities issuing the documents. Th e European Commission 
assures EU citizens that they can feel safe: the document will contain a limited 
amount of information, and will not be able to be stored in the target Member States. 
Neither is a central EU-level database for the collection and storage of the documents 
envisaged. Processing and accss will only be possible for selected entities, the list of 
which will be publicly available, allowing citizens to exercise their data protection 
rights under the General Data Protection Regulation. In addition, although the 
COVID certifi cate has security features confi rming its authenticity, it cannot be ruled 
out that there will be attempts to counterfeit it. At this point, it is diffi  cult to say how 
the project will be implemented in practice and whether the privacy of certifi cate 
holders will be violated. Th e project is only in the implementation phase, so the 
coming months will show whether it has fulfi lled its role and whether assurances 
about its security were true. 
Th e EU assures that the proposed digital solutions do not risk discrimination. As 
Cecilia Rodriguez rightly sees, the implementation of such a tool sounds interesting 
at fi rst glance. However, aft er deeper refl ection, the question arises as to whether 
its use will not divide society, deepen inequalities, increase social exclusion and 
discriminate against certain social groups.44 Information in the package leafl ets of 
vaccines licensed in the EU indicates that there is a group of people who should not 
be vaccinated or who should take precautions when it is given. Th ese include people 
who are allergic to the active substance or any of the other ingredients of the vaccine; 
who have a problem with blood clotting or bruising or are taking blood-thinning 
medicines; whose immune system is not working properly; pregnant or breast-
feeding women; and children.45 Th ere is also a group of people who do not want 
to be vaccinated, which is their right. Vaccination for COVID-19 is not currently 
mandatory. Even if such compulsion is introduced, some in the legal community 
argue that it will be incompatible with the right to human dignity; the introduction 
of compulsory vaccination stands in opposition to this right and the right to health 
protection or the prohibition on subjecting individuals to scientifi c experiments, 
including medical ones, without their free consent. Th ere are views that advocate 
that, under the current circumstances, submitting to COVID-19 vaccination is 
participation in a medical experiment.46 
44 C. Rodriguez, Covid-19 Passports and Travel: Free, Non-Discriminatory and ‘Non-fakeable’?, 16 
May 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ceciliarodriguez/2021/05/16/covid-19-passports-and-
travel-free-non-discriminatory-and-non-fakeable/?sh=2b8128e0581c (accessed 15.06.2021).
45 Who should and shouldn’t get the COVID-19 vaccine?, https://yalehealth.yale.edu/yale-covid-
19-vaccine-program/who-should-and-shouldnt-get-covid-19-vaccine (accessed 17.06.2021).
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Th e groups of people indicated above who wish to cross a border will have to use 
a certifi cate stating a negative result of a test for coronavirus. At the moment the tests 
performed on their own are paid for privately. Even if there is a formal decision on 
reimbursement, it will take a logistical eff ort for the tests to be performed whenever 
a trip needs to occur. Th ese people will be able to move without a certifi cate but with 
the full knowledge that they will be complying with existing restrictions in Member 
States, including quarantine and testing. Th e EU must ensure that those who are 
not certifi ed have free access to coronavirus testing. Th is is especially important for 
economically vulnerable groups who need free and quick access to tests. 
A potential threat is also the question of whether, in a situation where the 
pandemic will persist for many years, the EU will not go a step further in the future 
and decide to extend the scope of the certifi cates, following the example of solutions 
introduced, for example, in Israel and the United States and as is already the case in 
some EU Member States such as Denmark, Germany or Hungary. In these countries, 
access to public places such as restaurants, theatres, cinemas, hotels, sports and 
recreation centres or participation in major cultural and sporting events is already 
based on them. If this happens, unvaccinated people may become second-class 
citizens who would be excluded from many areas of social life. 
Conclusions 
Freedom of movement and residence in the Schengen area is one of the most 
important achievements of the European Union. Th e 2018 Eurobarometer survey 
shows that 88% of respondents identify the Schengen area as one of the EU’s 
main achievements, and nearly three out of four respondents believe that it is not 
worth participating in the EU without freedom of movement.47 Th e absence of 
internal borders, and therefore of border controls, has for many years been part 
of the European reality, creating facilities for tourism, trade, provision of services, 
education and work. Th e outbreak of the pandemic made it clear that the European 
Union was not prepared for this type of threat, which essentially prevented the 
exercise of freedom due to individual, albeit legally permissible, restrictions 
introduced by Member States. Th e pandemic also highlighted previously unseen 
problems in Schengen governance that prompted the EU to discuss undertaking 
necessary reforms. It has also introduced formal and digital solutions to coordinate 
Member States’ individual eff orts to curb virus transmission and restore freedom 
of movement. Th e research hypotheses presented in the introduction of this article 
have been confi rmed. So far, the implemented digital solutions which were proposed 
by the EU are paying dividends. Th e biggest is the Digital Green Certifi cate; the 
47 D. Schade, Crisis-Proof Schengen, op. cit., p. 2.
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implementation of the project is expected to ultimately result in the rapid opening 
of the internal borders of the Schengen area. Nevertheless, already today we can see 
potential threats resulting from the adopted digital solutions. Th ese include threats 
related to human rights, such as the limitation of privacy, fear of surveillance by the 
authorities issuing documents, risk of discrimination, risk of division in society and 
exclusion of individuals from many areas of social life. Due to the fact that the project 
is in the preliminary stage of implementation, it is diffi  cult at this point to predict 
all the negative eff ects resulting from it. A fi nal assessment will be possible in a few 
months, when the project will come into force in all EU Member States.
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